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Mortgage Controver.sies 
Few fields in finance today are changing as 
rapidly as the mortgage market. Various types 
of mortgage instruments have proliferated, 
while  traditional mortgage lenders have been 
joined in the marketplace by various "crea-
tive" financiers, including homeowners 
themselves. The most vigorous debates, how-
ever, have centered around the trend toward 
variable rate mortgages, and also around 
recent court decisions regarding mortgage 
"assumability," whereby an outstanding 
mortgage can be passed from one owner of a 
property to subsequent owners. 
Consumer groups have opposed variable-
rate instruments on the grounds that they 
unfairly shift risk to individual households. 
Lenders, on the other hand, feel that they 
need just such a shift if  they are to survive in 
today's volatile interest-rate environment. 
Meanwhile, consumer groups and realtors 
alike have argued for the assumability of old 
fixed-rate mortgages as a means of keeping 
the housing market alive. Yet, lenders worry 
that assumability tends to slow down the 
turnover of  their mortgage portfolio-and in 
addition, are offended by the courts' retro-
active "rewriting" of  contract terms. 
These differences of  opinion are understand-
able, since the issues involved are complex 
and much uncertainty prevails concerning 
future interest-rate trends. Some simple eco-
nomic analysis can, however, illuminate 
some of  the points of  controversy. 
Options arid mortgages 
One useful analytical device in this regard is 
the theory of  options. Traditionally, we think 
of options as distinct securities-such as the 
options on corporate stock that have been 
widely traded on exchanges since 1973. But 
in its most general form an option is simply a 
contract-or stipulation within a contract-
that gives the owner  the right to trade in some 
asset at a defined price any time on or before 
a given exercise date. From this perspective, 
many mortgage features actually represent 
options. 
Consider, for example, the prepayment 
option. Typically, mortgage terms permit the 
borrower to terminate his obligation to the 
lender by paying off  the remaining principal if 
he wishes. In options terminology, the 
borrower is the owner of a call option 
because he has the right to acquire ("call 
away") an underlying security-namely the 
mortgage-from the lender who is the option 
writer. The exercise price of  this option is 
the remaining principal (plus, typically, pre-
payment penalties.) 
Mortgages also typically contain "due-on-
sale" clauses, which give the lender the right 
to demand immediate repayment of  the out-
standing principal at time of sale of  the real 
estate securing the loan. This clause (which is 
atthe heartofthe "assumability" debate) also 
creates an option. In this case the lender is the 
owner of  a put  option because he has the right 
to demand that the borrower purchase the 
underlying mortgage security. (The lender 
can "put" the mortgage to the borrower.) 
Finally, even fixed-rate and variable-rate 
features can be related to options, although 
the relationship is a bit more complex. In its 
purest form, a variable-rate mortgage (VRM) 
carries an effective rate which changes every 
period with short-term interest rates; at any 
point in time, therefore, the market value of 
the loan is equal to the remaining principal, 
so thatthe mortgage would "sell at par" in the 
secondary market. In a sense, the VRM and a 
simple fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) are similar 
for downside interest-rate movements be-
cause the borrower can refinance an FRM 
(ignoring prepayment penalties and trans-
action costs). But for upside rate movements, 
the VRM in essence gives the lender an 
option to compel the borrower to refinance. 
Thus a VRM is similarto an FRM which 
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and written by the borrower. (Actually, the 
VRM option is a sequence of  options, a 
complexity we need not go into here.) 
The theory of  options on debt securities thus 
perm  its us to identify the factors that affect the 
value of options. This in turn permits us to 
analyze mortgages in a simplified fashion. 
Options theory indicates, for example, that 
an unexpired option will have positive value. 
Although the options implicit in mortgages 
are not b9ught and sold on exchanges, they 
should have value to the parties involved. An 
option will thus influence a mortgage's effec-
tive yield and/or the fees charged to obtain 
the mortgage. 
Options theory also suggests that uncertainty 
about the future value of  the underlying 
security should influence the value of  the 
option. Such uncertainty typically arises out 
of uncertainty about future interest-rate 
movements, so that option values tend to be 
positively linked to interest-rate uncertainty. 
The greater the uncertainty about interest-rate 
movements, the more valuable becomes 
an option on any debt security such as a 
mortgage. 
FRMs vs. VRMs 
These notions can be used to focus the debate 
between borrowers and lenders concerning 
the apparent trend toward variable-rate mort-
gages. In this approach, the VRM may not be 
the consu  mer  disaster suggested by its critics. 
As we have seen, the lender with a VRM 
obtains ownership to an option. A borrower 
will require compensation for writing this 
option, in the form of  a lower cost for VRMs 
than for FRMs; thus the market interest rate on 
a simple FRM will always be greater than a 
VRM rate. Options theory suggests that, in 
case of  uncertainty about  future interest rates, 
the option's value will be large-and the dif-
ferential between VRM and FRM borrowing 
costs will be correspondingly large. Although 
writing options is risky-the VRM does in-
deed "pass risk" to individual households-
the cost of  a VRM shou Id be sufficiently lower 
than the FRM to compensate for this risk. 
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The criticism that VRMs force households 
into housing "gambles" also appears 
misdirected. First, viewed from a portfolio 
standpoint, a household with a house and a 
VRM loan is unlikely to suffer a net loss in 
wealth if  interest rates rise. Over  time, interest 
rates tend to rise because of  rising inflation 
expectations. These same expectations cause 
housing prices to rise, so that with a given 
VRM indebtedness, the household's net-
worth position in housing (that is, the value of 
housing minus the value of mortgage debt) is 
not likely to fall. Second, although the 
payments required on a VRM loan may rise 
sharply enough to cause "cash flow" 
problems, this largely can be overcome by a 
VRM which permits increases in the loan 
balance ("negative amortization") rather 
than sharp changes in payment size. Over 
time, property-value movements can be 
expected to offset the rising indebtedness, so 
that net wealth probably would not decline 
for any hous.ehold whose fixed nominal 
income requires negative amortization to 
offset payment increases. During the recent 
period of rapidly rising interest rates-1973 
to the present-a fixed-income household's 
net worth in housing would have risen every 
year, even with such negative amortization 
(see chart). 
Whereas consumers may be overly pessi-
mistic about VRMs, lenders may be overly 
optimistic. It is not reasonable, for example, 
to expect variable-rate instruments per se to 
improve earnings. Indeed, as argued earlier, a 
properly priced FRM should always provide 
the lender with a higher expected yield than a 
VRM. Of  course, if  rates rise unexpectedly, ex 
post the lender wou  Id have been better off 
holding the option implicit in the VRM; and if 
rates fall, he wou  Id have been better off with 
an FRM because he wou  Id not then have 
"paid" for the option. But ex ante the VRM 
cannot be relied upon to improve earnings 
simply because of its ability to reduce risk. 
Wellenkamp and assumability 
Options analysis also offers some insight into 
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California court decision regarding mortgage 
assumability. The California Supreme Court's 
decision in the case of Wellenkamp v.  Bank 
of  America et. al. voided the due-on-sale, 
clause in mortgages, thereby permitting a 
home buyer to assume a seller's existing 
fixed-rate mortgage. The court reasoned that, 
in an environment of rising market rates, the 
seller's inabilityto offer the new buyerthe old 
rate of interest could have "an inhibitory 
effect" on the sale of  the house, because the 
seller could be forced to "(absorb a) loss with 
the resulting reduction in his equity." The 
court in turn saw this as a violation of  Section 
711  of  the California code, which prohibits 
unreasonable restraints on "alienation" of 
property. 
The court's decision cannot be defended in 
terms of options theory, however. The due-
on-sale clause is a put option owned by the 
lender; since options have positive value, 
loans with such clauses will be offered in 
competitive markets at lower rates than loans 
without such clauses. In effect, the borrower 
(Wellenkamp) had already received compen-
sation for the risk of any "inhibitory" effe<::t 
such a clause might have had on the net sales 
proceeds of  the real estate. 
Since the Wellenkamp decision applied 
retroactively to outstanding mortgages, it 
effectively took away the ownership of an 
option with positive value, and represented a 
one-time transfer of  wealth from the lender to 
the original borrower. The borrower could 
capture this windfall by being able to sell the 
property for more than wou  Id have been 
possible without the attendant low-cost 
financing. In the long run, however, Wellen-
kamp will raise nominal mortgage rates (or 
mortgage-origination fees), since lenders can 
no longer "buy" the option implicit in the 
due-on-sale clause and must, therefore, 
assume increased lending risk. 
Future mortgages 
Despite widespread predictions about the 
death of the fixed-rate mortgage, options 
theory suggests no reason to expect a single 
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set of mortgage features to dominate the 
marketplace. Markets could exist for all of  the 
various "options" that distinguish mortgage 
instruments because of  differing individual 
circumstances, similarto the multiple options 
now available for trading on individual cor-
porate stocks. 
We have seen, for example, that both the 
VRM and the FRM have their respective 
virtues and liabilities. The VRM is riskier for 
the household than the FRM, and without 
negative amortization, may pose more 
onerous ca6h-flow problems as well; it is 
unattractive to the borrower without a con-
siderably lower rate than the FRM. The VRM 
is less risky for the lender than the FRM; but it 
may pose cash-flow problems for the lender if 
accompanied by restrained payment changes 
(negative amortization), since the lender's 
deposit payouts are not similarly restrained. 
The comparative importance of these diverse 
types of mortgages wi  II depend upon 
borrowers' and lenders'  comparative tastes 
for risk, institutional constraints and 
transaction costs. 
According to the usual argument, financial 
i  ntermed  iaries are better able to bear risk than 
households, because of  their ability to 
diversify portfolios and because of  their 
relatively superior financial expe'rtise. 
Lenders also may have potentially better 
access to capital markets and futures markets, 
so that they can overcome cash-flow 
constraints and pass on risk to speculators 
more easily than households can. Lenders 
thus may profit from offering FRMs and 
constructing portfolio hedges against 
interest-rate risk (to the extent permitted by 
regulations) rather than eliminating risk by 
making only (lower yielding) VRMs. 
Similarly, lenders' comparative ability to deal 
with cash-flow problems would suggest the 
use of  those VRMs that restrain payment 
changes (negative amortization), in order to 
offer households relief from the cash-flow 
problems posed by conventional VRMs. 
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(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
12,535  9.0 
13,372  11.4 
5,594  16.6 
6,231  13.1 
- 744  3.1 
461  51.1 
349  - 5.5 
- 484 .  - 3.1 
- 4,331  - 9.9 
4,875  -15.3 
230  0.8 
22,898  36.4 
23,014  42.1 
12,050  51.5 
Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended  Comparable 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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